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TAX COMMENT
Subdivision 7 of the Revenue Act of 1918. Haberle Crystal Spring
Brewing Co. v. Clark, 280 U. S. -, 50 Sup. Ct. Rep. -. Decided
Jan. 27, 1930.
Good will,' although property, is not such property as can be
segregated from the capital assets and has no existence except as an
incident of a going business. 2 This intangible property,3 not being
subject to depreciation, cannot be classed with other intangibles as
patents, copyrights, licenses and franchises, 4 and is not an assignable
asset apart from the business. Upon the sale of a business the price
received would reflect the loss or gain of good will and any such loss
would be a basis for a deduction under the statute 234a.5 The sec-
tion ( under which the plaintiff claims the deduction has been con-
strued to refer to the obsolescence only of property used in trade or
business as is subject to exhaustion, wear and tear. 7
The Supreme Court, in upholding the decision of the collector,
held that when a business is extinguished as noxious under the Con-
stitution the owners cannot demand a partial compensation from the
government in the form of an abatement of taxes otherwise due.
Further the Court held that obsolescence as intended by Congress in
the Revenue Act of 1918 was not meant to include extinguishment
of business, caused by operation of law.
E.S.
INcomE-RESIDUARY LEGATEES-ACCRETION IN VALUE OF
LEGACIE.-The father of the petitioner died testate, May 20, 1918.
Under a final decree of the Surrogate's Court entered on April 19,
1920 certain stocks were distributed to the petitioner as one of the
residuary legatees. He sold some of the stocks in 1920, 1921 and
1922. In computing the amount of his income tax, he used as a
basis for arriving at the profit or loss on each sale, the selling price
1 "Goodwill is the advantage or benefit, which is acquired by an establish-
ment, beyond the mere value of the capital, stock, funds, or property employed
therein, in consequence of the general public patronage and encouragement
which it receives from constant or habitual customers, on account of its local
position, or common celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality,
or from other accidental circumstances or necessity or even from ancient par-
tialities or prejudices." Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149
U. S. 436, 446.
2Joseph Garneau Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 8 B. T.
A. 1041 (1927) ; Kaufmann v. Kaufmann, 239 Pa. 42, 86 Atl. 634 (1913).
' "Goodwill is property of an intangible nature and the term property
includes goodwill." Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., supra Note 1.
'Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willcuts, 15 F. (2nd) 626 (C. C. A. 8th,
1926).
'Supra Note 4, supra Note 2.
'Rev. Act of 1918, Sec. 234a, Subd. 7 (Act of Feb. 25, 1919). C18, 40
Stat. 1057, 1078.
'Supra Note 4.
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of the stock and its value on the date of distribution. The Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue held that the value at the date of the
testator's death should be taken for the calculation of income. The
petitioner paid the additional tax under protest. He brought this
action in the District Court to recover the amount exacted, and the
judgment in his favor has been reversed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals. Held, judgment affirmed. The title acquired by the peti-
tioner to the stocks on the date of distribution related back to the date
of the testator's death, the latter date thus becoming the date of
acquisition within the meaning of the acts governing the taxes in
question. Brewster v. Gage, 280 U. S. -, 50 Sup. Ct. Rep. 115
(1930).
The Revenue Acts in question are those enacted in 1918 and
1921.1 The language of the acts, although not expressly stating that
residuary legatees shall be taxed upon the income derived from lega-
cies from the date of the decedent's death, has been construed by the
Treasury Department to have that effect, and the regulations promul-
gated to enforce the acts have been accordingly drafted.2 Thd gen-
erality of the words used in both acts indicates intention that the date
of death of the decedent was to be taken as the basis in all cases.
Upon the death of the owner of personal property, title does not
vest at once in his next of kin or legatees.3 But there does vest im-
mediately in each of them the right to his distributive share of so
much as shall remain after proper administration; and the right to
have it delivered after entry of the decree of distribution.4 There
vests in the executor or administrator, upon acceptance of the trust,
title to all the personal property. This title is held for the beneficia-
ries. The decree of distribution confers no new right; it merely
identifies the remaining property, evidences the right of possession
in the next of kin or legatees, and requires delivery by the executor or
administrator. 5 The petitioner's right to have his share vested im-
mediately upon the decedent's death. Undoubtedly the basis for the
ascertainment of gain or loss on the sale of real property by an heir
or devisee is its value at the time of the death of the decedent. That
is the time of acquisition. Specific legacies are handed over to the
legatees generally soon after the testator's death, and before the entry
of the decree for final distribution. In such cases the gain or loss is
calculated under these acts on the value at the time of death. There
is nothing in either of the acts to indicate a purpose for establishing
'Rev. Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1057, 1060, 1065; Rev. Act of 1921, 42 Stat.
227, 229, 237.
2 Reg. 45, Art. 1562; Reg. 62, Art. 1563.
'U. S. v. Jones, 236 U. S. 106. 112; 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261 (1915).
' Sanders v. Soutter, 136 N. Y. 97, 32 N. E. 638 (1892) ; Vail v. Vail, 49
Conn. 52 (1881).
'Wager v. Wager, 89 N. Y. 161, 166 (1882); Thompson v. Thomas, 30
Miss. 152, 158 (1855).
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two bases, (1) value of real property and specific bequests at the
time of death, and (2) value of other property at the date of decree.
The Revenue Act of 1928 expressly established value at the
time of death of the decedent as the basis of calculation in respect to
sales of personal property acquired by specific bequest and of
real estate acquired by general or specific bequest or by intestacy,
and in all other cases fixed fair market value at the time of distribu-
tion to the tax-payer as the basis.6 The deliberate selection of lan-
guage so differing from that used in the earlier acts indicates that a
change of law was intended. Ordinarily, statutes establish rules for
the future and they will not be applied retroactively unless that
purpose plainly appears.7
B. E. D.
INCOME-SALE OF TRUST AssET.-This case arose from a de-
murrer to a complaint at law instituted by the plaintiff to recover
income taxes paid under protest. A resident of the state of Con-
necticut, Sumner, by his will named the plaintiff as trustee of the
residue of his estate to pay the income to his wife during her life,
remainder to certain charities. There was a clause in the will em-
powering the trustee to pay over to, or for the benefit of, the wife
any part of the principal of the trust fund which it might deem
necessary or advisable for her comfortable maintenance and support.
In 1926 some of the securities forming part of the trust fund were
sold by the plaintiff and a profit realized. The question before the
Court was whether this profit should be considered as income of the
estate during the widow's life. Held, judgment affirmed. Hartford-
Connecticut Trust Company et al. v. Easton, etc., 36 F. (2nd) (C.
C. A. 2nd, 1930).
The power granted to the trustee under the will was lim-
ited, the limitation being that the widow was to receive no part
of the principal of the trust fund unless, in the opinion of the
plaintiff, it should be deemed necessary for her comfortable mainte-
nance and support. The evidence showed that the widow lived in a
modest way considering the income from her husband's estate and her
own resources. Her standard of living, her tastes, and her character
were such that at no titfie was there any reasonable possibility that
the plaintiff, as trustee, would deem it necessary or advisable to use
any part of the principal for her comfortable maintenance and sup-
port. It has been held by the courts of Connecticut that where the
income from property is given to a husband for life, and the neces-
sary power "if he should want for his support, to sell any part or
the whole of it for his maintenance," that the word "want" is to be
construed as meaning "need" and the test is whether the husband is
'Rev. Act of 1928, Sec. 113 (a), Subd. 5.
U. S. v. Magnolia Co., 276 U. S. 160, 162 (1928).
